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Introduction
The concept of tribal states and tribal kingdoms has rapidly gained momentum in the study of the 
history of the Levant over the past years. Particularly the kingdoms of the Iron Age, Ammon, Moab, 
Edom, Aram, Israel and Judah are often refered to as Tribal Kingdoms, although it remains unclear 
what exactly is meant by ‘tribal kingdom’. However, in the past years several scholars have ventured 
definitions of what a tribal kingdom is (Knauf 1992; Labianca and Younker 1998, Labianca 1999; 
Bienkowski and van der Steen 2001; van der Steen and Smelik 2007). These eforts generaly focus 
on the Iron Age states east of the Jordan, Ammon (Younker and Labianca 1998, Labianca 1999), Moab 
(van der Steen and Smelik 2007) and Edom (Knauf 1992; Bienkowski and van der Steen 2001). 
The model that is being developed largely constitutes the merging of a tribal social organization 
with the political framework of a state or kingdom. Most of the research focuses on archaeological 
and historical sources, framed into a theoretical model. The role of ethnoarchaeology has remained 
limited, largely because the gap between the Iron Age tribal societies and the modern states of the 
region seems too wide to bridge. Although it is regularly stated that some of the modern Near Eastern 
states, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have a large tribal component, they are too much embedded 
in modern society to be useful as a paralel. Therefore the etnoarchaeological component of these 
studies focuses on tribes’ internal politics, and on tribal economy, rather than on tribal state formation.
　　However, there are developments and societies in the recent history of the Near East, that, when 
we look at them more closely, can provide insights into tribal state formation on a number of diferent 
levels.
The political context of the 19th century Arabian peninsula
During the 19th century AD the Southern Levant, the region of Syria (including Palestine and 
Transjordan) and the Arabian Peninsula were formaly part of the Otoman Empire. However, in 
practice most of the region was more or less independent, controled by the local Arab tribes (al-
Rasheed1991: 14–15; Browne 1806: 416–7; Seetzen 1854–59/I: 340–41; Burckhardt 1822; 1829 
passim). These tribes had an ambivalent relationship with the Otomans, that fluctuated with the 
relative military strength of each party. Sometimes tribes were induced or forced to pay tribute to 
the empire, but mostly the local tribes controled the teritory south of Hebron in the west, and 
south of Wadi Mujib in Transjordan. They were paid to keep the Haj routes from Cairo and Damascus 
safe, and to refrain from robbing the pilgrims. From time to time batles and minor wars were fought 
between the Empire and the tribes.
　　During the later part of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century the Otoman empire 
was under severe threat from the Wahhabi religio-political movement. This movement, which 
originated in Saudi Arabia envisioned a purification of the religion of Islam, and their ideals were 
imposed by force. The Wahhabis swept over the peninsula, converting or kiling muslems and 
imposing tax on Jews and Christians, and then moved north through Syria. In 1807 the Otoman 
empire commissioned Muhammad Ali, Pasha of Egypt, to defeat and rout out the Wahhabis. In 
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1818 the Egyptian pasha took and sacked the town of Dir’iyya, the seat of the Ibn Sa’ud and of 
the Wahhabi power. But he did not stop there. He and his son Ibrahim Pasha moved on to take control 
of the region themselves. Between 1831 and 1841 they ruled Syria, until the Otomans, with the 
help of the western imperial powers defeated the Egyptian pashas and drove them back into Egypt.
　　As a result of this and other threats to their power the Otoman government implemented a 
series of reforms, known as the ‘Tanzimat’. The corupt administration was replaced by a system 
of civil servants, tax reforms were imposed and setlement and agriculture encouraged in an efort 
to get more control over the bedouin population. The efects of these reforms were mostly felt in 
the coastal regions of Lebanon and Palestine, much less in the inlands, where the Kerak area and 
everything south of it, remained largely unafected until 1893. On the Arabian peninsula local powers 
stil vied for hegemony, involving and transforming the local mosaic of tribes and tribal 
confederations. One of these local powers was the emirate of Hayil, led by the Ibn Rashid family. 
The history of the rise and decline of this emirate is the subject of this paper. It emerged out of 
the tribal confederation of Shammar, and during its existence the tribal social organization remained 
a determining factor in the political, economic and social life of its subjects. Therefore it is suggested 
here that the Emirate of Ibn Rashid can throw light on the emergence and development of tribal 
states in the Iron Age, such as Moab, Ammon and Edom, and perhaps also Israel and Judah.
Short history of the emirate of the Shammar
The emirate of Ibn Rashid emerged from the tribal confederation of the Shammar. The Shammar, 
like many tribes that entered the Arabian subcontinent over time, originaly migrated from the Yemen, 
possibly in the 9th century AD (al Rasheed 1991; Walin 1854–55/1979: 79).
　　The land in which they setled consisted of two chains of granite mountains, opposite each other: 
Jebel Aga and Jebel Selma, often refered to as the ‘Two mountains’.
　　It was already inhabited by two other tribes: the Qais and the Tay. Originaly the Shammar shared 
the Two Mountains with the Qais and the Tay, but eventualy they took control and the other two 
tribes gradualy disappeared. In the course of the folowing centuries the tribe expanded, in the 17th 
century it split up, and one group moved north to Mesopotamia in search of pasture. The other 
group remained in the Jebel Shammar. At the end of the 18th century, in response to the growing 
threat of Wahhabism another section of the Shammar joined the earlier northern section. These were 
the Sufuk and the Zakarit, who earlier used to migrate north on a seasonal basis (Walin 
1854–55/1979: 73; Burckhardt 1830, 167, 176–7). The northern Shammar lived as pastoralists and 
farmers. They maintained contact with the southern Shammar, and every year a major camel caravan 
traveled north from Hayil to the Shammar in the north bringing back rice and other goods.
　　The history of the rise and fal of the emirate has been told by several travelers (Walin 
1854–55/1979: 66–68, Doughty 1921/I, 13–18, Palgrave 1873, 84–94, Blunt 1880/2002: 99, 
194–206; see also Oppenheim 1952: 37–45 and al-Rasheed 1991 with references).
　　The Shammar confederacy consisted of four independent tribes: the Sinjara, the Abda, the Aslam 
and the Tumam. These were subdivided into clans or subtribes and there were also several alied 
tribes such as the Mutair and Subei’. Another alied tribe, the Beni Tamim, were descendants of 
once powerful tribe that predated the Shammar tribe in the Jebel. They were agriculturalists, and 
had their own vilages in the Shammar teritories.
　　In 1836 a change of leadership took place among one of the tribes of the confederation: the Abda. 
The leadership of Muhammed Ibn Ali, paramount sheikh of the Abda, was chalenged by his cousin 
Abdalah Ibn Rashid. Abdalah was exiled from Abda teritory as a consequence. He left and found 
refuge in Riadh, with the Ibn Saud family, the leaders of the Wahhabi movement. The Wahhabi 
movement had been severely weakened by the take-over of Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim of Egypt, 
but they had regained a certain amount of power on the peninsula, and the Shammar were tributary 
 TRIBAL STATES IN HISTORY　121
to them. One day, when Abdalah was out hunting with Faisal, the son of the Ibn Saud leader, a 
coup took place in Riadh, and the sheikh was murdered. Thanks to the help of Abdalah, Faisal 
managed to depose the usurper, and regain the leadership of the Ibn Saud. Out of gratitude, Faisal 
Ibn Saud declared Abdalah Ibn Rashid the Shaykh Mushayyekh (paramount sheikh) of the Abda tribe, 
instead of Ibn Ali. This, of course, did not mean that Ibn Ali would submit his leadership to Abdalah, 
merely that Ibn Saud would support Abdalah if/when he made a bid for leadership.
　　Abdalah Ibn Rashid now returned to his home country and started to colect supporters with 
whom he eventualy managed to depose Ibn Ali and gain leadership of the Abda.
　　He was an ambitious man, and he immediately started to expand the power of the Abda. In 
a relatively short period he managed to raly not only the Abda behind him, but also the other Shammar 
tribes, the Sinjara, the Aslam and the Tuman. Thus he changed the structure of the confederation, 
which now had a leading tribe, and a paramount sheikh, something they had not had before.
　　Abdalah died in 1847. He was succeeded by his son Talal without any opposition, and with 
the support of the population of Hayil. Talal’s rule efectively changed the structure of the tribal 
aliance that his father had forged, into a state-like structure. He also changed the title of his ofice 
to amir. He was stil sheikh of the Abda, but the title amir refered to his leadership over the whole 
confederation. Abdalah had already been recognized as the leader of the confederation, but now 
this leadership was formalized, and the Rashidis recognized as the leading family.
　　Talal finished the building of the Barzan palace started by the Ibn Ali and continued by his father, 
and he encouraged international trade, and concentrated it in Hayil. This was greatly stimulated by 
his liberal atitude. He encouraged not only Shite muslims but also Jews and Christians to setle 
and trade in Hayil (al-Rasheed 1991: 57–58; Palgrave 1873: 93; Musil 1928: 239). He rebuilt 
setlements outside Hayil, and expanded his dominions, not only by conquest, but also through his 
liberal politics and the prosperity and peace of his government, which encouraged other tribes and 
towns to aly themselves to them (Palgrave 1873: 56–7, 129) – a process that was greatly facilitated 
by the tyrannical politics of the Wahhabi. Tribes and towns would ‘vote with their feet’, choose under 
whose protection they wanted to be, by simply paying or withholding tribute, and many prefered 
the Rashidi leaders.
　　Succession was firmly established within the Rashid family, but apart from that, there were no 
rules. Al-Rasheed has tried to establish paterns prefering horizontal or vertical succession lines 
(al-Rasheed 1991: 71–72). However, the succession history of the Rashidis shows that the only 
clear rules that applied were that succession was within the Abdalah line of the Rashid family, and 
that any successor needed the support from the Shammar tribes. Because of this, succession could 
become a bloody afair, which was especialy clear when Talal died in 1868.
　　He was succeeded by his brother Mitab, who was murdered within a year by Talal’s eldest 
son, Bandar. Many members of the family fled Hayil, and went to Riyadh, the Wahhabi / Saudi capital, 
which ofered them refuge.
　　Another brother of Talal’s, Mohammad, was a caravan leader between Hayil and Iraq. In this 
capacity he managed to gain the support of both the townsmen (who were interested in the revenues 
of the international trade) and the nomadic population, who had an interest in the provisioning of 
the trade, by providing camels, and receiving tribute. Through his considerable military skils, 
Mohammad could guarantee the safety of the trading caravans. Thus he acquired wealth, as wel 
as wide support among the population, and when he came back from one of his journeys, he mudered 
Bandar, and pronounced himself amir. He proceeded by kiling practicaly al the male members 
of the family, possible contenders for the throne.
　　Mohammad’s rule was the longest in the history of the Shammar emirate, lasting from 1869– 
1897, when he died of natural causes. It was also the period of the greatest expansion of the emirate. 
Mohammad incorporated most of Nejd, including the Saudi teritory with the capital Riyadh, and 
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to the north expanded towards Jauf, while even Palmyra paid tribute to the Rashidis (Musil 1928: 
243). Under Talal and Muhammad the oasis of Hayil grew into one of the largest trade centres of 
the region.
　　Mohammad had appointed a successor, his nephew Abdel-Aziz, the son of Mitab who was 
murdered by Bandar. He had adopted Abdel-Aziz and prepared him for the throne. Perhaps as a 
result of this, the succession went smoothly.
　　It was however hard for Abdel-Aziz to maintain the expansion of the emirate that his uncle 
had efected. The Saudis had fled to Kuwayt, where their claims were supported by the ruling Sabah 
family. In 1902 they managed to recapture Riyadh, and in 1906 Abdel-Aziz was kiled in a batle 
against them.
　　He was succeeded by his son Mitab. However, Mitab’s succession was not supported by the 
Ubayd branch of the Rashidi family, who commanded the support of a majority of the Shammar. 
He was murdered by Sultan ibn Hamud ibn Ubayd, and the emirate reverted for a short while to 
the Ubayd branch. By this time the decline had set in. Sultan tried to further expand his teritory 
(Devey 1907, quoted by al-Rasheed 1991: 63), but in fact he lost several districts. He was murdered 
by his brothers, and a bloody struggle for the succession folowed. The continuing war with the 
Saudis, the political bickering among the contenders for the throne, and the fact that revenues of 
both the trade and the Haj were declining because of the construction of the Hijaz and Baghdad 
railways, eventualy brought about the end of the emirate. The first World War was the death blow 
to the power of the Ibn Rashid. In 1921 they were expeled out of Hayil, and that was the end of 
their emirate.
The concept of tribal state or kingdom
Traits of tribal states
In order to ‘streamline’ the discussion about tribal state formation, Labianca (1999) has tentatively 
formulated a number of features which he believes are salient for tribal kingdoms in the Iron Age. His 
frame of reference was the Iron Age kingdom of Ammon, but these traits have been equaly applied 
to other polities in the region such as Moab (Routledge, van der Steen and Smelik 2007) and Edom 
(Bienkowski and van der Steen 2001). 
　　In order to understand how and why these tribal kingdoms came about and functioned in ancient 
society, it is essential to analyse the process that created them. Political entities (or ‘polities’) must 
be seen as a process in time, in which political, economic and social elements of organization change 
in reaction to internal and external developments, and any name given to these political entities, 
such as tribe, chiefdom, (early, tribal, segmentary) state, is only a coarse reflection of the political 
reality or realities it represents. If ‘State’ refers to the level of political organization, ‘tribal’ refers 
to the social organization that forms the building blocks for the political structure. No two tribal 
states wil look the same, or have the same combination of traits. The ‘trait list’ therefore is a starting 
point, not a definition. The gradual process that leads from a basicaly tribal society, to a tribal 
state or kingdom, folows many diferent roads. If there is a continuum, or perhaps a ‘stepped’ 
continuum from a typical ‘tribal’ (egalitarian, group oriented, with limited power for the leader) society 
towards more complexity and integration (typical features of kingdoms or states), the thing to 
remember is that during this process the tribal society did not shed its basic social structure, which 
remained intact during the transformation, and in fact became incorporated in it, an essential part 
of the ‘new’ state. Because of this, because the essential elements of the tribal society were stil 
present, it was always possible for the state to disintegrate back into its original components, the 
tribes.
 - a tribal kingdom would coalesce out of a tribal aliance usualy under influence of outside 
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pressure or threat.
 - The rise of a strong man at the right moment, who is acceptable to al the tribes.
 - the pre-monarchical tribal social structure would not be extinguished by the rise of kings. 
A ‘class-based’ society, with an urban class controling a ‘rural class’ would not evolve.
 - Basic features of tribal society would continue to exist, such as the association of tribes with 
their traditional teritories; an economy that continues to take place on the scale of the 
individual tribes; and overlapping of teritories among tribes for diferent economic purposes.
 - The intra- and intertribal social organization would be used and adapted in order to 
accommodate the bureaucracy that was the result of the kingdom structure.
 - Tribal hinterlands would be administered from fortified centres, but most people would stil 
be living in the hinterlands, in their own traditional tribal teritory.
 - Power structures within the kingdom were heterarchical rather than hierarchical: there could 
be several power bases on the same level, basing their power on diferent resources, such 
as economic, religious or political resources. 
 - The maintenance of a central militia, to protect the interests of the kingdom as a whole. 
 - A strong economy, to guarantee the independence of the state, and to provide the means to 
execute the prestige projects, and to buy the cooperation of the tribes.
The Rashidi emirate as a tribal state
The short history of the Rashidi emirate above, ilustrates the process of the tribal state in a number 
of features.
External political pressure leads to a higher level of integration and political organization
The Arabian peninsula was in a state of turmoil as a result of the power struggle between the Wahhabis, 
Muhammad Ali, pasha of Egypt, and the Otoman empire. From the beginning of the Wahhabite 
expansion, the Shammar were traditionaly opposed to them (Oppenheim 1939: 134), and their 
subjection to the Wahhabis was the result of a number of defeats in batle. In 1818 Muhammad 
Ali had defeated the Wahhabis and sacked their home town of Dir’iyyah. However, some 15 years 
later the Saudi leaders had regained much of their former power, and governed the peninsula from 
their new capital, Riyadh. Many of the tribes on the peninsula, either out of fear or opportunism, 
swore alegiance to the Saudis. Those who didn’t were raided and forced into submission. This 
growing power of the Saudi polity caused resistance among various of the tribes, among which 
were groups of the Shammar. At the same time both the Otoman empire and the Egyptians were 
pressing into the peninsula to reinstate their power (see Baily Winder 1965 for a general overview 
of power relations on the Peninsula in the 19th century). Rasheed (1991: 46–7) suggests that it was 
this threat which drew the various Shammar tribes together and made them consent to one overal 
leadership.
Abdalah: the Strong Man
The man who acquired that overal leadership was Abdalah Ibn Rashid, a cousin of the sheikh of 
the Abda. He had gained the support of Faisal Ibn Sa’ud, the leader of the Wahhabi in Riadh, but 
it was his personal qualities that gained him the leadership of the Abda1. “His intrepidity and 
manliness, his strict justice, often inclining to severity, his unflinching adherence to his word and 
promise, of a breach of which he was never known to have rendered himself guilty; and, above al, 
to his unsurpassed hospitality and benevolence towards the poor, of whom, it was a wel-known thing, 
　 　 1 Winder (1965: 101–105), largely basing himself on the historian Dari Ibn Rashid, gives an extensive description of the take-over 
of Hayil by Ibn Rashid.
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none ever went unhelped from his door”. (Walin 1854–55/1979: 68)2. There were also his reputation 
for prowess in batle, and probably the fact that he was supported by his brother Ubayd, who was 
as brave a soldier, but more cunning, more of a politician, and with less charisma (Winder 1965: 
105; 240), and who was content to support and probably influence his brother backstage3.
　　After taking over the leadership, Ibn Rashid remained loyal to his Saudi alies, but at the same 
time he began to forge the Shammar confederation into a more integrated structure. He stressed 
the capital role of Hayil by further building the palace in the Barzan, that was started, by his Ibn 
Ali predecessor, and other major building projects. He also laid the base for a standing army, and 
used it to ensure safety on the roads. He demonstrated his own military prowess in raids on the Anaze, 
in which the other tribes were invited to take part – in return for a part in the booty. The long-
lasting feud with the Anaze had its origins in regular raids by this tribe into Shammar teritory, but 
it was enhanced by the 1838 Shammar conquest of Jauf, which lay in Anaze teritory. This, and 
another long lasting feud with the tribes of Qasim (south of Shammar), was the incentive for a 
series of raids and batles, in which al the Shammar tribes participated, and were invariably victorious 
(Winder 1965: 134, 154). These batles did much to cement the confederation.
　　Leadership in Near Eastern tribes was a combination of ascribed and achieved qualities. A sheikh 
was chosen from one leading family, and the sheikhdom usualy remained within that family. A 
change in the leading family was a major, and usualy bloody event4. While the leader had to come 
from the leading family, within the leading family the succession was less clear: a sheikh could be 
succeeded by his son (not necessarily the eldest) or his brother, or another family member altogether 
(although a succession further removed than a son or a brother could be seen as a take-over, and 
sometimes caused tension). So the hierarchy of leadership was crystalized as far as the family level, 
but not to the level of the actual successor. This remained an issue in the Ibn Rashid dynasty until 
the last days of the empire, and contributed to its downfal.
　　The choice of the actual leader depended on achieved qualities: courage and prowess in war, 
inteligence (mostly trouble-shooting qualities, and the capability to keep the peace within the tribe), 
generosity, charisma. Material wealth was important insofar as it enabled the leader in question to 
practice his generosity, an aspect that was vital in acquiring the support of the leaders of the coalition 
tribes.
　　The sheikhly family of the Abda were the Jaafar. Abdalah Ibn Rashid was ibn amm (paternal 
cousin) of Ibn Ali, sheikh of the Abda, so the change in leadership from the Ibn Ali to the Ibn 
Rashid did not, in fact, involve a complete turnover in the leading family, something that made the 
transition easier. The Jaafar family supported the change of power. Abdalah had taken care of his 
succession, by appointing his son Talal as his successor, an appointment that was supported by the 
family (al-Rasheed 1991: 57). After Talal’s death in 1868, however, a struggle broke out over the 
succession. Talal was succeeded by his brother Mitab, who had the support of the family, but after 
a year Mitab was kiled by Talal’s son Bandar. Bandar was kiled within a year by another brother 
of Talal, Muhammad. Muhammad had made a career as a caravan leader, and built up a network 
with both the nomadic and the setled sections of the Shammar. His coup was supported by both 
the Jaafar family and the Shammar tribes. Nevertheless he took the precaution to murder the complete 
　 　 2 Palgrave’s description of Abdalah’s rise to power already has aspects of a heroic epic, featuring miraculous rescues from death and 
heroic prowess, demonstrating how oral traditions create heroes.
 3 Several very diferent reports have been given of Ubayd, among others by Palgrave (1873: 189), who dismissed him as a fanatic 
and a traitor, and by Blunt (1880/2002: 194), according to whom Ubayd was the ‘principal hero of the Shammar tradition’.
 4 When leadership within the tribal confederation of the Tiaha changed from the Ibn Atiyeh to the Hukuk, this was accompanied by 
the murder of most of the members of the previous leading family (Oppenheim 1943: 111). The takeover of leadership among the 
Huwaytat at the end of the 19th century by the Abu Tayyi caused major tension among the Huwaytat in Lawrence’s army during 
the first World War.
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Talal branch of the family. (Doughty presents this as an inevitable blood revenge, which was folowed 
by the necessary extinction of other possible contenders). The aspect of personal ambition, and the 
murders that eventualy became almost a regular feature of the succession (Blunt 1880/2002: 271; 
al-Rasheed 1991: 66–74) seem to have been part of the transition to a more state-like organization, 
the result of the increasing prestige of the position of amir as compared to that of a tribal sheikh. 
In 1906 Abd el-Aziz was succeeded by his son Mitab, but Mitab was powerless because he did not 
have the support of the tribe, and he was deposed by another branch of the family altogether: the Ubayd 
branch, descendants of the first amir’s brother Ubayd, who had never before made a bid for the throne.
The tribal organization as political building blocks of the emirate
The Shammar were a confederation of four tribes: the Abda, Sinjara, Aslam and Tuman. They refered 
to themselves as a qabila, a term that in this case can be translated as ‘tribal confederation’5 (al-
Rasheed 1991, 18).
　　Definitions of both the word ‘tribe’ and the concept of tribalism abound in anthropological 
literature (Parkinson 2002 has definitions in most articles). There is, however, a huge discrepancy 
in definitions deriving from New World research and those used in Near Eastern studies. These 
discrepancies mainly deal with issues such as economy/subsistence, mobility, size, and complexity 
of organization. The economic, political and social organization of Near Eastern tribes has been 
described extensively by Eickelman (1981: 85–104); Lancaster (1981); Salzman (2004) among 
others. This is not the place to add another definition. There are several traits that seem universal 
among societies that are considered ‘tribal’ worldwide, and that al researchers seem to agree on. 
These are: 
 - a segmentary society structure, in which the ‘segments’ are generaly formed by kinship or 
lineage groups or clans. These segments are integrated into a larger whole by means of 
sodalities, networks of solidarity groups that cross-cut the clan structure and keep the clans 
together. The kinship structure does not necessarily reflect actual family relations, but can 
be manipulated and changed for social or political reasons, with the consent of the members.
 - Leadership of the tribe is a combination of ascribed qualities (it usualy resides within a leading 
family, for example) and achieved qualities.
 - The rules of social interaction, both within the tribe and between tribes, are strongly determined 
by the concept of honour.
　　While the confederation was known to the members as a qabila, the separate tribes, the Abda, 
Sinjara, Aslam and Tuman, were known as asha’ir (sing. ashira) (al-Rasheed 1991, 19–22). The 
ashira consisted of a number of lineages or clans, the hama’il (sing. hamula) who were associated 
into larger groups, ‘maximal lineage units’, the fukhud (sing. fakhd). The fukhud, unlike either the 
asha’ir or the hama’il seem to have been the basic economic unit. They claimed ownership of 
wels and pasture grounds, and shared a wasm, a tribal mark.
　　Every ashira had its sheikh, who was the tribal leader and who came from the leading lineage 
in the ashira. The leaders of the Sinjara were Ibn Thunayan; of the Aslam Ibn Twala; and of the 
Tuman Ibn Timyat. Until the coup by Ibn Rashid, the sheikhs of the Abda were Ibn Ali. This 
coup had far-reaching consequences for the qabila, as it completely changed its political (but not 
its social) structure. Until then, the qabila had no leader. Abdalah Ibn Rashid was the first leader 
of the whole qabila.
　 　 5 Qabila is sometimes interpreted as a confederation, sometimes as a (large) tribe. In line with segmentary lineage theory the tribes 
have a ‘nested’ structure, with ‘tribes’ consisting of ‘subtribes’, consisting of ‘clans’ consisting of families. Tribes could become 
part of confederations. This organization is fluid, and tends to change over time – tribes merge into confederations that eventualy 
come to be seen as tribes, and vice versa, tribes grow, and split up, subtribes growing into tribes and tribes into confederations.
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　　The asha’ir had a bond of alegiance, that was dormant most of the time and consisted as an 
ideal rather than as a practical policy, but that could be activated when circumstances required (Jaussen 
1908: 114).  This would generaly be in times of political or economic stress. Political stress could 
be caused by outside threats, when a tribe was atacked and raided, or its teritory threatened. In 
such cases the other tribes would be requested to aid the threatened tribe. Or it could be the result 
of intertribal conflict, which would then be setled peacefuly within the terms of the bond of alegiance.
　　Economic stress could be caused by droughts, crop failure, sickness among animals and the 
like, in which case a tribe could claim economic support, or the use of another tribe’s wels and 
pastures6.
　　Common ways to maintain the bond of alegiance in ‘dormant’ periods were by means of 
reference to a shared apical ancestor (al-Rasheed 1991: 20), and intermariage.
　　The tribal sheikhs, particularly those of the Shammar tribes, also remained autonomous leaders 
in their teritories, and the amir had to consult with them, if he wanted their support or that of their 
tribe.
　　In some of the subjected teritories (i.e. teritories belonging to conquered tribes), the amir would 
occasionaly change a leader of a vilage, and replace him with someone of his own choice, but 
this also was an exception. Taima, conquered by Talal ibn Rashid, had a ‘resident’ representative 
of Ibn Rashid, but the government of the town was left to the local sheikhs (Doughty 1921/I: 333–5). 
In Jauf, conquered in 1838, there was stil no Rashidi representative in 1845 (Walin 1854–55/1979: 
31). When Palgrave visited Jauf in 1862 (Palgrave 1873: 31), there was a governor from Hayil, 
appointed by Ibn Rashid, Hamud. But he had only been sent to Jauf in 1853, after and because 
the town had rebeled and been recovered. Palgrave also mentions a Rashidi-appointed mayor in 
the vilage of Feyd (Palgrave 1873: 138) but notes at the same time that the general system of 
government of the subjected domains was to appoint a local chief  “for it is only in rare instances 
and for very particular reasons that he appoints one of the capital or the central district to be prefect 
in a distant locality”. The strong Rashidi control of Jauf, when Anne and Wilfred Blunt visited the 
place in 1878, was recent, and due to the fact that it had been briefly  conquered by the Otoman 
forces of Damascus, and again recovered by the Rashidis (Blunt 1880/2002: 117–119).
　　Winder observed that, contrary to the political organization of Riyadh, which was a purely 
religious state, ‘the Rashidi government was an extended tribalism’ (1965: 241). His main argument 
is that in spite of the fact that the Shammar were Wahhabi’s, their tribal consciousness overuled 
their religious consciousness.
　　The integration of the social organization of the traditional Shammar tribal society into the 
political organization of a state rested on several pilars.
　　The Rashidi amirs made sure to maintain and strengthen the bonds with the sheikhs of the 
other Shammar sections. The sheikhs participated in the raids that the Rashidi organized, and were 
given gifts to buy and maintain their loyalty, and thus the loyalty of their tribes. Apart from that, 
mariages were aranged that strengthened the network. Other tribes were subjected in the course 
of the expansion of the emirate, but they were ruled through their own sheikhs (Doughty 1921/I: 
46–47).
　　The addition of a new title, that of amir, which was efected by Talal, the second Rashidi leader, 
can be seen as a benchmark for the change of confederacy to tribal state, mainly because it was 
accepted by the leaders of the other tribes. Talal did not stop being sheikh of his own tribe, the 
　 　 6 Honour violation could be a cause for activating the bond of alegiance, as in the case of the qabila of the Ibn Amr on the Kerak 
Plateau, described by Dissard (1905: 417) and Musil (1908: 78). In this case the wife of Dhiab, sheikh of the Ibn Qaisum, an Ibn 
Amr ashira, was sexualy assaulted by a sheikh from a friendly tribe, the Hameide. This induced Ibn Qaisum to cal in the aid of 
another Ibn Amr ashira, the Ibn Tebet. In spite of the fact that the Ibn Qaisum and the Ibn Tebet had a feud at that moment, the 
Ibn Tebet felt obliged to answer the cal, and as a result the Hameide were expeled from the Kerak Plateau.
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Abda, but he added a layer to the hierarchy of leadership, and he now had two separate but interlinked 
roles: that of leader of his tribe, the Abda, and that of representative of the whole confederation (al-
Rasheed 1991: 78–9). The sheikhs of the other tribes could stil withhold their support (and did 
so, towards the end of the emirate) and had to be consulted, and coaxed into supporting the amir 
with presents. This increased the importance of material wealth, and gave the Otoman government 
a chance to increase its influence with the Rashidis, by subsidizing them.
The continuation of basic features of tribal society: tribal territories
The tribal teritory of the Shammar consisted of the Two Mountains, the Jebel Aja and the Jebel Selma, 
together the Jebel Shammar, and some of the surounding lands. The four Shammar tribes each 
had their own teritory: that of the Abda contained the Jebel Aja, extending east and north of it, 
and including several vilages and oases, the most important of which was the oasis of Hayil; the 
Sinjara lived to the north and west of the Jebel Aja, their teritory partly overlapping with that of 
the Abda. Sections of the Sinjara would move north in spring, past Jauf and spend the summer 
and fal in Iraq. The teritory of the Aslam included Jebel Selma with its oases and vilages. The 
Tuman camped further north, separate from the other Shammar tribes, their teritory extending from 
north of the Darb Zobeida into Iraq, although they would on occasion wander south, into the Abda 
and Sinjara teritory, where they enjoyed protection (Oppenheim 1952: 37). Over time there had been 
changes in the tribal teritories, such as when the first branch of the Shammar moved to Mesopotamia, 
and later, in the 19th century, when the second branch moved to join the first (Oppenheim 1952: 
37).
　　At the heyday of its power the domains of the emirate greatly exceeded the traditional teritory 
of the Shammar. Abdalah Ibn Rashid subjected the oasis of Jauf, in the northwest and forced them 
to pay zaka (the religious tax, imposed by the Wahhabis); his son Talal added the oases of Taima, 
Khaibar, Hayyet and Huwayyet in the Harath Khaibar, al to the west of the core area of Jebel 
Shammar. Muhammad Ibn Rashid beat the Sa’udis and extended the domains to the east and north. 
In his days the emirate reached the height of its power, ruling from Hauran and Palmyra in the 
north to the borders of south Arabia. They maintained good relationships with the Otoman empire, 
their formal overlords, although hardly one of submission. The emirate recognized the Otoman 
supremacy mainly in the Friday prayers in the mosque (Palgrave 1873: 55).
　　There was, therefore, a clear distinction between the domain of the state, and the teritory of 
the tribes, which was strictly maintained. The domains outside the Shammar teritories were the 
teritories of other tribes, who were subjected to the emirate, paid tribute, and had to accept the 
presence of Shammar police forces and sometimes a governor but who were, apart from that, left 
to their own devices and tribal squabbles (Doughty 1921/I: 32), as long as they remained loyal to 
the emirate. They were turned into subjected, vassal tribes. Both the growing power of the Rashidis 
and the harsh Wahhabism of the Sa’udis induced tribes to voluntarily ofer their submission to Ibn 
Rashid. One case is described by Doughty (1921/I: 52): a section of the Kahtan (from Qasim) had 
split of from the main tribe, and ofered repeatedly to become ‘Rashid’s Arabs’. Ibn Rashid, who 
considered the Qasim tribes as enemies, refused, and only ofered them the use of his pastures without 
any obligation: “we are not of you; we wil neither help you nor hurt you.” 
　　The dominions remained loyal partly because the rule of the amirs had brought peace and security, 
and partly out of fear. The amirs ‘ruled by the sword’, and the subjected tribes never became real 
loyal subjects, or submited their inherent independence and autonomy. “The Beduw and oasis 
dwelers are not liegemen (as they see it) to any but their natural sheykhs” (Doughty 1921/I: 31).
Tribal economy
The Two Mountains abound in springs, fed by an aquifer with good water, and in addition to the 
springs wels were dug to exploit it. Thanks to the water and the quality of the soil, the inhabitants 
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of the mountain chains were largely self-suficient.
　　The Shammar confederation had a multi-source economy, supported by three pilars: pastoralism 
(both sheep / goats and camels), agriculture (mostly dates), and trade.
 - Pastoralism was an important aspect of the economy. Camels were used both by the farmers 
in farming, and for the trade. As a large segment of the Shammar had moved to Mesopotamia, 
there were extensive trade relations with the north, for which many camels were needed. 
Walin describes how setled members of the Armal (a Sinjara subtribe, Oppenheim 1952: 
49) owned large camel herds, which they herded out with “their nomadic brothers”, or with 
hired herdsmen. They also bred horses, which were considered the best in the region, but 
these were largely used as prestige objects, and given as presents to other rulers. There was 
some horse trade with Egypt, as the Egyptians has acquired a taste for Shammar horses during 
the reign of Muhammad Ali. But in general horses did not figure largely in the economy 
in a direct sense, although they could play an important role in the establishing and maintenance 
of networks (Walin 1854–55/1979: 74). Sheep and goats were also part of the pastoral 
economy.
 - Agriculture was practiced in the oases. This mostly consisted of date-growing, for which 
the region was famous. Other products from the oases were a variety of fruits and vegetables, 
wheat and barley (Al-Rasheed 1991: 95). Partly this was produced by sedentary branches 
of the Shammar tribes, or by their slaves and dependents, and partly by an old tribe that had 
alied itself to the Shammar: the Beni Tamim (Walin 1854–55/1979: 64). The products of 
both pastoralism and agriculture were exchanged in markets in the towns and vilages. 
According to Walin (1854–55/1979: 65) “Thus continual intercourse and the most intimate 
relations, grounded upon mutual interests and reciprocal assistance, are kept alive betwixt 
the two classes of Shammar, which has greatly contributed to the increasing power of that tribe”.
　　The third pilar on which the economy rested was long-distance trade. Since the Shammar 
produced the camels that were needed for the trade, they were necessarily involved in it, as producers 
of the means of transport, guides and escorts. There were, every year, four main trade caravans to 
the northern Shammar in Mesopotamia, and many smaler ones, and much of the wheat was imported 
from there, as wel as luxury goods such as rice (Walin 1854–55/1979: 49) and manufactured goods 
of leather and textiles. Anne and Wilfred Blunt were proudly shown a telephone by Muhammad 
ibn Rashid (Blunt 1880/2002: 255).
　　When the Rashidis came to power, they did not interfere with the first two pilars of the economy, 
pastoralism and agriculture. These continued uninterupted, in the hands of the individual tribes, 
as did the local trade or exchange of these products on the local markets. It was the third mainstay, 
the international trade, that became the economic base for the power of the Rashidis.
The economy of the emirate
Talal, the second Rashidi ruler, supported and enhanced trade by creating a major international trade 
market in Hayil, his capital (al-Rasheed 1991: 57–9. 100) and encouraging merchants from elsewhere 
to setle in Hayil (Palgrave 1873: 93,112; al-Rasheed 1991: 100–101). He had an active interest 
in the trade caravans, for which he provided escort (al-Rasheed 1991: 103). His brother Muhammad, 
who later became the next amir, made his career as a caravan leader, an enterprise through which 
he gained both wealth and the network that would maintain him in power later (Doughty 1921/I: 604). 
Thus, by taking control of the international trade, through both active involvement in it, and taxing, 
the Rashidis managed to build up a considerable capital which they used to execute their prestigious 
building projects, to buy the loyalty of the sheikhs of the other Shammar tribes, and build up and 
maintain their own standing army (Oppenheim 1952: 44).
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　　Apart from the international trade, an important source of income were the revenues of the Haj. 
One of the major Haj routes, the Darb Zobeida, ran past Hayil. The fanaticism of the Wahhabis, 
in Riadh, also played in the hands of the Rashidi capital: Shites, who were considered heretics by 
the Wahhabis, would avoid Wahhabi teritory, and travel to the holy cities via Hayil (Doughty 1921/I: 
49–50).
　　So the oasis of Hayil developed into a major market town and a central place, the absolute 
centre of gravity for both the economy and the power of the emirate. 
Tribal social organization was used and manipulated to organize the bureaucracy of the emirate
By creating the emirate, a hierarchical level above that of the sheikh, the Ibn Rashid also created 
an artificial distance between themselves and their tribesmen, a distance that did not exist between 
the sheikh and his tribesmen. As a result, the Ibn Rashid interacted with the other sheikhs and with 
the tribes on two diferent levels: that of a first among equals, a tribal sheikh, and that of the ruler. 
This discrepancy was best expressed in the architecture of the palace in Hayil, and the role it played 
in everyday life. The palace has been described by numerous travelers (Walin 1854–55/1979: 
200–01, Euting 1896: 200–01; Doughty 1921/I: 5; Palgrave 1873: 72–73). It had a large courtyard, 
surounded by a heavy wal with high towers and bastions, meant both to impress, and to set the 
leadership apart from its subjects, unlike a tribal sheikh, who traditionaly camped among them.
　　One of the responsibilities of a sheikh or tribal leader, was the setling of disputes. The judiciary 
system was simple, and derived from the tribal system of justice. In the tribal system the sheikh 
would be the first court of justice; dificult cases were put before professional qadis (Burckhardt 1830: 
66–75; Jaussen 1908: 132–33, 181–185). Ibn Rashid continued this practice, in that he would hold 
court every morning, and sometimes in the afternoon as wel, on the courtyard of his palace (the mejlis; 
Palgrave 1873: 97; Doughty 1921/I: 607–8). These sitings were accessible to everybody with a 
complaint, and the amir would judge every case that was brought before him, assisted by qadis 
from the town. Justice was practiced in the same way in other towns (Palgrave 1873: 53) on behalf 
of the emir. Thus the amir was informed of anything that happened in his realm, and at the same 
time he maintained his direct contact with the tribe members. What difered from the tribal system 
was that the amir had, through his professional police force, a means to enforce his sentences, 
something a tribal sheikh would generaly not have (Doughty 1921/I: 607). Punishments were 
executed on the spot, thus underlining the judicial power of the amir.
　　Another feature that set the Rashidi ruler apart from his subjects was his wealth, which was 
much larger than that of any tribal sheikh, and which he amassed mainly through taxes on the trade. 
The use he made of this wealth, however, remained for a large part the same as that of a tribal sheikh. 
He used it both to impress, and to increase his power and influence by means of his generosity – 
by ‘buying’ the sheikhs of the confederation. The sheikhs were the channel through which the support 
of the other tribe members was bought.
　　Apart from that he used it to maintain his bodyguard. It is clear that the danger of murder 
made a bodyguard a necessary accoutrement of a Rashidi ruler, but it also set the ruler apart from 
the other sheikhs of the confederation, who never had a professional army, however smal. 
　　Nevertheless, the authority of the amir never became fuly institutionalized. Every amir had 
to gain it from the first day of his emirate, and to work on it for the rest of his career. The tribes, 
and their sheikhs, always had the possibility to withhold their support, as happened in the case of 
Mitab, the son of Abd-el Aziz, in 1906. He did not have the support of the ruling family, or of 
the other tribes, and as a consequence he was powerless. During and after World War I the Ibn Rashid 
lost the support of many tribes who joined the Ibn Saud or the Hashemites, and in 1921 their emirate 
was ended, through internal dissention among the Rashidis themselves (Oppenheim 1952: 40–41; 
Musil 1928; al-Rasheed 1991).
130　Eveline J. van der STEEN
Hayil as a central place
Over time Hayil grew from a minor oasis vilage to the central place of the Shammar emirate. 
When Walin visited Hayil in 1845 it was stil a relatively smal oasis, with some 210 houses. The 
Rashidi residence was already the largest, and Walin refers to it as the ‘palace’. Palgrave visited 
the place in 1862 and he describes fortifications ‘of about twenty feet in height, with bastion-towers, 
some round, some square, and large folding gates at intervals….its area might readily hold three 
hundred thousand inhabitants or more, were its streets and houses close packed like those of Brussels 
or Paris” (Palgrave 1873: 71). Palgrave estimates the number of inhabitants as 20,000, which is a huge 
exaggeration, but shows how impressed he was with the town.
　　When Doughty visited the town in 1877 he estimated that it had 3000 inhabitants (Doughty 
1921/I: 617), and it was stil growing. Doughty describes the town wal, with towers and gates, 
numerous markets, and the diferent quarters into which the town was divided, each surounded by 
a wal (Doughty 1921/I: 584–88; I: 5). Euting, who visited the town in 1885, was lodged in the Persian 
quarter, where the Persian traders lived, and he mentions the existence of a Slave quarter, which housed 
the 1000 slaves that belonged to the amir (Euting 1896/I: 178–180). Surounding the town were the 
tents of semi-setled bedouin (Doughty 1921/I: 619) who lived under the protection of the amir. Thus 
the town consisted of public buildings and areas, such as the palace, the main mosque, the commercial 
area with markets and shops, and a large proportion of its inhabitants were foreign traders. There 
was also a special slave quarter, the Suq el-Abd, where the household of the amir was housed (some 
200 persons in the days of Muhammad, according to Euting (1896: 216). The percentage of actual 
Shammar inhabitants remained low, most of them living in their tents outside the town, or in the 
other oases.
　　The main reasons why Hayil would have become the central place, was, firstly because the 
Rashidis made it so, and secondly, because it lay on a major trade- and haj route. Originaly it 
was a smal oasis. Some three hours walk from Hayil was a much larger vilage, Kafar, which 
belonged to the Beni Tamim. Kafar was the main local market for basic supplies, such as dates 
and cereals, which were exchanged for catle, but it was rarely visited by traveling tradesmen, who 
generaly went to Hayil.
　　In the time of Mohammad Ibn Rashid the town had gained a metropolitan outlook, with goods 
traded from al over the world, and most of the money that changed hands being in foreign (European) 
curency (Doughty1921/ I: 9).
Creation of a standing army
The Ibn Rashid managed to bring peace and security to the region. It was said in Walin’s day, 
that ‘one may go from one end of the land to another, bearing his gold on his head, without being 
troubled with any questions’ (Walin 1854–55/1979: 68). This was in the early stages of the emirate, 
during the reign of Abdalah. The same was said during the reign of Mohammad.
　　This peace and security was one of the main assets of the Rashidi amirs, and one that every 
traveler in the region commented upon. Abdalah Ibn Rashid began to build a professional army 
(Walin 1854–55/1979: 66; al-Rasheed 1991: 57), consisting of slaves and conscripts from outside the 
tribal community (Doughty 1921/I, 32, 35–6; deserters from the Turkish and Egyptian armies formed 
a substantial part of it, as wel as individual bedouin tribesmen). His brother, Ubayd, was permanent 
commander, the equivalent of the tribal Agyd (Burckhardt 1830: 168–69; Musil 1928: 506; Doughty 
1921/I: 27).
　　Bedouin tribes had no professional soldiers. Every able man took part in the wars and raids, 
and then went back to his camels or date gardens. The creation of a standing army and a police 
force was rare, and intimately linked to the leadership position of the amir (al-Rasheed 1991: 
133–158). Euting (1896: 201) describes how several deserters came to the court of the amir, where 
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they were fed and clothed, prior to being incorporated in the army. There was also a police force, 
consisting of volunteers from the Shammar and the Beni Tamim tribes. These forces were used not 
only to guard the palace (Palgrave 1873: 73) and execute the sentences of the amir during his daily 
court sitings, but were also sent as permanent ‘peace-keeping forces’ in the subjected domains (Euting 
1896: 127) and sent on expeditions in the countryside to control the bedouin and prevent their raiding 
(Palgrave 1873: 66). Apart from this professional army, the traditional ‘ad hoc military service’ of 
tribesmen continued to exist, particularly for raids on other tribes, although according to Doughty 
they were also involved in the daily court proceedings (Doughty 1921/I: 607–8). These tribesmen 
came not only from the Shammar tribes, but also from the other subjected tribes, who were generaly 
eager to take part in these raids for the booty (Doughty 1921/I: 20–22; Walin1854–55/1979: 34).
Discussion and conclusions
The Emirate of the Ibn Rashid has been described as a tribal state in the above discussion. However, 
the concept of a tribal state is flexible. The only definition that seems universaly valid is that it 
integrates aspects of a ‘traditional’ tribal society, into the organization of a state-like political entity. 
Which aspects these are, and how they are used to organize the state, may difer with every instance, 
and is dependent on external factors such as economy, external relationships, religion, etc.
　　The provisional ‘trait-list’ composed by LaBianca and others, therefore, is no more than a 
guideline, suggesting on the one hand reasons why the two forms of social and political organization 
(the ‘tribal’ and the ‘state’ organization) can become integrated, and on the other hand ways in which 
this integration can manifest itself.
　　In the case of the Rashidi Emirate the reason for integration of the tribal polity into a state-
like organization was political unrest in the Arabian peninsula, first caused by the pressure of the 
Egyptian forces of Muhammad Ali, and later by the expansion of the recovering Wahhabi polity of 
the Ibn Sa’ud in Riyadh. The rise of Abdalah Ibn Rashid was the direct result of the failing rule 
of his predecessor, Salih Ibn Ali of the Abda, but his recognition by the other Shammar tribes, and 
the transition from a loose confederacy of independent tribes, into a much more integrated state-like 
polity, was both due to his personality, and the need for a strong leader to counter the threats from 
the surounding tribes. It was, however, his son, Talal, who ‘formalized’ the state, by pronouncing 
himself amir.
　　The tribal organization of the Shammar was integrated and used in the emirate in various ways. 
Conquered tribes were generaly ruled through their own headmen, and only occasionaly was there 
a Rashidi – appointed presence in the conquered town or vilage. Tribal teritories were maintained, 
and the local economy was organized and controled by the tribes. It was through influencing the 
tribal leaders, that the support of the tribes for the government was maintained.
　　At the same time, the power and status of the amir vastly exceeded that of the traditional tribal 
sheikh. The absolute centre of gravity of the emirate was the oasis of Hayil, which the amirs had turned 
into a major central place, the centre of the trade, of military power, and of justice. It housed the 
institutions of power, rather than the population, the vast majority of which lived in the hinterlands.
　　The creation of a permanent military power and police force, also enhanced his power and 
lifted him above the level of the sheikh, as traditionaly a tribal leader had no power of coercion, 
and could not command his tribe.
　　Transformations comparable to those of the Ibn Rashid emirate can be observed in other societies 
in the region, making clear that there is no specific trajectory from ‘tribal confederation’ towards ‘tribal 
statehood’.  Nuri Ibn Sha’alan, leader of the Rwala, a tribe of the large Anaze confederation, had 
the same power of coercion that the Ibn Rashid had built up (Glubb 1960: 40–41). This power 
rested on the presence of ‘a veritable police force to coerce dissident tribesmen’ and a large number 
of slaves (Lancaster 1981: 84), forming a militia comparable to that of Ibn Rashid. He was said 
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to have absolute power in his teritory (Jaussen 1908: 143).
　　Another tribal confederation, that of the Kerak Plateau, headed by the family of the Majali, 
also had aspects of the integration into a more state-like structure. The leading family, the Majali, 
had more power than a ‘normal’ tribal sheikh, although their power and influence among the tribes 
was to a large extent dependent on their personal qualities. They had no standing army (something 
Ibn Shaalan did have) and therefore they had no power of coercion, and for every raid or batle, or 
in fact, any major decision they needed to gain the support of the tribe members (Burckhardt 1822: 
382). On the other hand, they had turned Kerak into a central place, with a stronghold in the form 
of the old Crusader castle, and with a market, that was the economic centre of the region. According 
to Burckhardt they had become “complete masters of the district of Kerek, and have great influence 
over the afairs of the Belka.” (1822: 382).
　　Most of the Kerakis themselves lived outside the town, at least part of the year, to tend their 
flocks and their fields which could be found over most of the Kerak plateau (Burckhardt 1822: 387; 
Durley 1910: 176; Lynch 1849: 357; Tristram 1874: 82–83).
　　There were other towns in the region that functioned as market centres such as Salt in the Belqa, 
and Jauf. These however do not seem to have concentrated the sort of power in them that both 
Kerak and Hayil embodied.
　　Writen sources and archaeological remains from past societies, particularly in the Iron Age, have 
given rise to speculations about the formation of tribal states. The case study of Ibn Rashid shows 
that these tribal states, if and where they existed, were as much the result of the innate structure of 
the tribal societies in which they originated, as of the agents of local and international politics, the 
rise of powerful personalities, and climate. The particular features of these states are therefore hard 
to establish, and may have difered in every case.
　　There are limitations on our ability to reconstruct past political configurations using modern 
‘paralels’ and we have to be careful when we atempt it. However, political configurations cannot 
be separated from the society in which they emerge, and it is to the structure of that society that 
we need to look first when we atempt to analyze its politics. Shammar society in the Nejd in the 
19th century, in spite of its being taken up in international politics, remained tribal in its social, 
economic and teritorial structure. In its response to the events of the time it became a tribal state. 
Many of its features can only have occured in the 19th century, in the political and religious context 
of the time; however, many aspects also seem to have been timeless, and may give us an insight 
into what tribal states in the more distant past may have looked like. 
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